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Data Governance is a major area of concern globally. It evokes 
sharp reactions and divides nation along sharp fault lines. The 
stakes are high for businesses, for citizens and governments, all 
alike.  
A few days ago, the Indian government published its Draft 
National Encryption Policy. The badly written draft met with 
stiff public and political resistance. The emergent public 
resistance driven by lack of conceptual knowledge except in 
very informed circles leading to fear of big government 
snooping on citizens and the spiralling media frenzy led the 
government to withdraw the well-intentioned, albeit technically 
flawed, draft. 
Hereunder, I discuss the flaws of the policy that led to its early 
demise, the focus that the draft should have had, the underlying 
exigent national security imperatives, trade-off between the 
sovereignty of India and the individual freedom of Indians and 
the policy options ahead of the government to device a cogent 
data governance policy in India. 
A Stellar Wind 
A few days ago, a data-scientist colleague of mine and I were indulging in a conversation on data 
governance. The conversation traversed very quickly into the realm of cyberterrorism especially in 
the context of “Stellar Wind”, a sort of a euphemistically eponymous codename given to the 
President’s Surveillance Program in the United States of America. Taking that as the backdrop, we 
were discussing the various aspects – technological, legal, political and ethical. 
It stands to reason that the name “Stellar Wind” has been derived from an identical term in 
Astrophysics that refers to the flow of gas from the upper atmosphere of a star system. As a direct 
corollary, pollinated into the world of cyber intelligence, it would loosely mean a mechanism to 
monitor otherwise unreachable flow of personal, encrypted information generated by the universe 
of Internet users.  
Hot on the heels of this discussion, on September 21, 2015, the Department of Information 
Technology of the Government of India released the Draft National Encryption Policy (“Draft”, 
hereinafter). Thereby hangs a tale that was to end very quickly in the summary withdrawal of the 
Draft, consequent upon the hue and cry over privacy-invasion issues. 
However in matters of public policy, especially one that impacts the world of internet technologies 
and the footprint of digital data, it’s rather simplistic to assume that with the extinguishment of the 
draft policy the last word has been said and heard on this burning issue. The geostrategic realities of 
the borderless cyberworld are bound to fan the fires of data governance soon in foreseeable future. 
It’s up to the Narendra Modi government to react to it or respond pre-emptively. The Minister of 
State for Information Technology Mr Ravi Shankar Prasad has assured us that they would soon 
issue a reworked draft. 
Devils In The Draft 
One reading of the draft and you knew what was wrong with it. The draft started by introducing us 
to the importance of encryption and cryptography. It then asserted, both in part II and III, viz., the 
Mission and the Vision respectively, the centrality of a secure environment for the transaction of 
information in cyberspace. In part IV, viz., the Objectives, it specified the use of encryption for 
ensuring confidentiality and the protection of privacy as the primary goals. In effect it consistently 
established the principle of a strong data encryption regime as the bedrock of the draft.;so far so 
good. 
Here’s where things went downhill. In the next part, i.e. part IV, viz., Strategies, that became the 
bone of contention, the policy mentioned steps, that would in-effect, in the eyes of the citizens, 
academia, civil society, especially civil liberties group, the political opposition particularly the Left 
Liberals, take apart any meaningful regime of data encryption for millions of users of internet in 
India and instead expose them to hackers exploiting easy vulnerabilities. 
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The policy suggested that users in the B2B (business to business) and the B2C 
(business to citizens) sectors shall reproduce, “on demand”, the plain and encrypted text pairs of the 
information transacted. It went on to say that such record should have to be kept for a period of 90 
days from the date of the transaction. The draft collapsed under the weight of its own inherent 
contradictions. 
The din over privacy issues acted as a catalyst and a perfect political storm was in the offing. 
Significant damage to the perception of the government was avoided as Ravi Shankar Prasad acted 
swiftly and the draft was consequently recalled but not before the Indian media went to town with it 
and the political opposition parties seized the moment in launching a broadside against the Narendra 
Modi government, calling the draft an attack on the freedom of the people. 
Breaking The Draft Code: Blueprint To Avoiding Future Lapses 
The draft’s stated strategies in substance would have effectually decrypted the data, thereby 
exposing it to theft by the most plebeian of hackers and likely by even malware crawling on the 
internet. In doing so it would have contradicted the big talk of the mission, vision and the hallowed 
objectives of attaining data integrity. Whatever else the objectives might have been, it most 
certainly was not even in the remote vicinity of ensuring data encryption, because it did just the 
opposite. 
Much as the political opposition would love to call this a direct frontal attack on privacy, it would 
be touch naïve to assume that any government, in such plain sight, would make a brazen attempt to 
lay down rules to steal data for political use and then discuss those with the public, inviting wide 
consultations on the draft policy and that too in what would definitely be the most roundabout and 
perhaps ineffectual way of going about doing it! If ever such a plan is at all executed, it is likely to 
be done clandestinely, by stealth and not with such level of transparency, which would render the 
operation a farce. Point is, the good intentions of Narendra Modi government don’t seem to be in 
doubt. Unless one really thinks that Narendra Modi is stupid. He has been called a lot of things, but 
stupid is certainly not one of them. 
So, then, what was the objective? Those who are informed of the global context of the debate of 
data governance would not lose much time before figuring out the answer. Hint: if you read the 
opening paragraph of this article, it would dawn on the readers that data experts, cyber security 
experts and those grappling with the ethical fallouts of data integrity, encryption and privacy would 
have already been expecting, nay, demanding initiation of a policy discourse on the burning issue of 
data governance. 
Bugs In The Draft Data Encryption Policy 
First, the draft should not have had the narrow perspective that it did have and therefore should 
never have been called a Draft National Encryption Policy to begin with. It should have addressed a 
broader and a more serious series of data governance challenges. The primary challenge should 
have been that of Cyberterrorism and it should have clearly elaborated on the nature, extent and the 
seriousness of the threat, giving a global context,. It should therefore have been given a more 
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comprehensive name, simply the Draft Data Governance Policy. Only by taking such 
a holistic viewpoint could justice have been done to the policy. The draft failed because of its 
flawed tunnel vision. 
The draft should have mentioned the national security imperatives upfront, specifically 
cyberterrorism. It never did and the word “cyberterrorism” never appears in it. It should cited 
cyberterrorism as the single most important factor by far, that ordains and dictates the launch a full 
scale, systemic, knowledge capital based, research and development led, technological 
counteroffensive and policy driven cyber intelligence institution. 
Secondly, technologically, the draft lends itself to dabbling in superficial half measures. Instead of 
creating a fool proof system, it puts the onus on users to maintain a 90-day record of plain text and 
encrypted text pairs of all information transactions. 
Purely within the ambit of the draft policy, predicating the efficacy of a counter cyberterrorism, i.e. 
cyber intelligence effort on the predilections of the user, who might also turn out to be a hostile or 
rogue element, upon the suspected event of an act of cyberterrorism actually devolving, which 
should and would also be the natural premise of any such counter cyberterrorism operation to start 
with anyway, as the systemic key to the entire technological framework, is the most absurdist 
architecture imaginable. 
Not to mention the fact that in those 99% cases where the user is likely to be innocuous, the 
probability that the user would be even aware of the existence of such terms as “encryption”, 
“cryptography”, hash”, “key”, “public key” is bleak and should be assumed to be an impossibility. 
A technological system driven on something as complex as programming codes that are supposed to 
be geared up to tracking anti national activities such as cyberterrorism in real time is bound to 
collapse if it depends on human intervention, that too at the targeted end, for maintaining its 
integrity. This is laughable and hilarious to say the least. As my data scientist friend and colleague 
said – “people don’t even understand the difference between “http” and “https” yet”. Actually! And 
why the hell should they bother? 
Data Governance And Cyberterrorism: Setting Priorities 
Data governance needs to be seen most urgently and most necessarily in the context of 
cyberterrorism. cyberterrorism is a recent face of asymmetric warfare which is very competently 
deployed to devastating effect by organized gangs of terrorists, such as ISIS,,. cyberterrorism today 
is one of the biggest threats to the sovereignty of nations and a very effective tool in organizing and 
coordinating recruitment of disgruntled elements, launching funding efforts, spreading a campaign 
of hatred and plotting terror attacks,. 
Very importantly focus on cyberterrorism would evoke empathy and a far critical attitude from 
citizens. Let’s again look at the progression of “Stellar Wind”. There was resistance to the 
surveillance program both within government and from the public. Anti-snooping heroes of the 
world such as the Edward Snowden, Julian Assange et al have railed against the efforts of  
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governments to snoop on citizens, building up massive public opinion against government. Yet, 
Stellar Wind is here to stay because the threat to sovereignty form the enemy, as just discussed, is 
simply too grave to be ignored and sacrificed at the altar of individual privacy. 
cyberterrorism is the scourge that needs to be fought with Data Governance technologies, systems, 
mechanisms that defer to the asymmetric nature of the technique that uses such fancy and mostly 
unheard of methods as Steganography to spread the tentacles of terror. cyberterrorism is the 
leverage that allows lone wolves and to acquire dangerous proportions. Recall the infamous case of 
@ShamiWitness, the Twitter handle of a Muslim youth from the cybercity of Hyderabad, India. He 
was suspected to be running a successful and elaborate recruitment and organizing ring on Twitter 
on his laptop for ISIS. He was tracked and finally caught by India’s intelligence agencies in 
December 2014, post advent of the Narendra Modi government and Ajit Doval as the National 
Security Advisor to Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Considering a rudimentary cyber-intelligence 
operation, this is suspected to be a snowflake on the tip of the iceberg. 
Hence, the discourse on Data Governance must start with an order of precedence to priorities. 
Privacy and freedom of citizens is very important. But the discourse cannot end there. Privacy and 
freedom are meaningful only when the sovereignty of the nation, the integrity of the motherland 
stays intact. cyberterrorism is both a weaponizing mechanism and a weapon itself, threatening the 
integrity and sovereignty of India, putting India on a dangerous course to conflicts and strife. 
The stated policy must put the need to save us from the threat of cyberterrorism at a higher order 
than the need to protect our privacy and freedom. The Primary Objective must be – Secure 
Sovereignty. If individual privacy and freedom, however exalted an idea they might be in a 
democracy, be in conflict with prevention of an event of cyberterrorism, which is deemed to be an 
attack on the sovereignty of the nation, the latter must gain precedence. 
The Empire Strikes Back: Cyber Intelligence Counterstrike 
Thus, having established the first principle of the order of precedence of objectives, we must 
understand how best we can technologically deal with the challenge. Let’s go back to Stellar Wind 
again, the most formidable system of cyber intelligence known to man.  Stellar Wind works like a 
vaccum pump of astronomical proportions. It is suspected to suck data from around the globe at the 
rate of yottaflop (1024) operations per seconds. This data is not just in the shape of Internet digital 
data but also in the shape of cellular conversations from around the world. How’s it able to get 
access to so much data at a pan global scale? 
It’s able to do that because of the direct or extended jurisdiction the government of United States 
has over computer servers, communication satellites, underground and undersea communication 
cables that might be owned by the biggest names in the world of technology and are housed in USA 
domestically or over which USA has legal jurisdiction. Stellar Wind also goes beyond just ordinary 
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private data capture. It employs supercomputers that are suspected to be close to cracking Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES) level 256 bit encryption algorithms. 
The discourse in India, as evidenced in the draft, is nowhere remotely close to building a Stellar 
Wind. Also, it need not be the endeavor to mimic Stellar Wind, in toto. The strategy stated in the 
withdrawn draft was beset with multiple ills, talking from a pure technological perspective. The 
draft was very narrow and constricted in its approach and offers very crude, sub-optimal and 
therefore non-implementable and offered useless technological quick fixes that fell between all 
stools and instead of adding anything positive to India’s cyber security strength, would have only 
increased the vulnerabilities many a time over. 
Data Governance Algorithm 
Even as in the immediate term India cannot match (such competencies are built over decades and 
sadly India has been somnambulant on the cyber security front since independence), the length, 
breadth and depth, pretty literally, of the operations of a “Stellar Wind”, and while it might not be a 
model to be replicated in all ways as it might just be too sinister with too weak a mechanism of 
checks and balances, we can and should do a few things. Actually three things, specifically. 
First, tell the technology companies operating in India that they would have to move their servers to 
India. Period. This way, the servers would fall within India’s jurisdiction and with the help of 
enabling laws and in exercise of sovereign power, Indian government can then enforce data sharing 
programmes based on pre-set system of rules. We need to tell the technology companies that 
Cyberterrorism has become an overriding threat to India and if they don’t comply the very integrity 
of highest growth and mammoth market that India is, which funds their expansion, stands in 
jeopardy. The tech biggies might do a bit of fretting and fuming but they’d comply to protect their 
market. In the bargain they’d pressurize the Narendra Modi government to socialize the cost of the 
shift. They’d forward the argument that servers work best when not held hostage to physical 
location. None of these arguments are valid as both the cost and the performance impact would be 
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"A project of immense secrecy, it is the final piece in a complex puzzle assembled over the 
past decade. Its purpose: to intercept, decipher, analyze, and store vast swaths of the world’s 
communications as they zap down from satellites and zip through the underground and 
undersea cables of international, foreign, and domestic networks. The heavily fortified $2 
billion center should be up and running in September 2013. Flowing through its servers and 
routers and stored in near bottomless databases will be all forms of communication, including 
the complete contents of private emails, cell phone calls, and Google searches, as well as all 
sorts of personal data trails—parking receipts, travel itineraries, bookstore purchases, and 
other digital “pocket litter.” It is, in some measure, the realization of the “total information 
awareness” program created during the first term of the Bush administration—an effort that 
was killed by Congress in 2003 after it caused an outcry over its potential for invading 
Americans’ privacy." 
- James Bamford on “Stellar Wind”, The NSA is building the Country’s Biggest Spy 
Center in “Wired”, March 15, 2012
negligible to miniscule. But considering the jobs that it might create in India, we 
might want to give them a few investment incentives. 
We might not be running a “Stellar Wind” but we surely are running mammoth programs such as 
“Digital India”, “Make In India” and “Smart Cities” and these programs would technologically and 
architecturally work like magic in concert with the idea of moving servers to India. Infact one 
cannot imagine Smart Cities into the next century without robust data governance systems that offer 
a resilient city to live in that’s quarantined from terrorist attacks. 
Most of all, if the citizenry’s argument against holding the decrypted data for 90 days as stipulated 
in the draft is that it is an attack on privacy (and it is a valid argument), then that argument would 
apply with exponentially, nay, astronomically greater force on keeping their data in servers outside 
India forever (as is significantly the case right now). Bringing the servers into India should therefore 
be welcome by Indian citizens because right now their data is vulnerable in the hands of American 
government, let alone the Indian government. In short it would be a political cushion for the 
Narendra Modi government. The Narendra Modi government can tell the Indian people that it shall 
be ensuring a far greater protection of the data of Indians by bringing the servers home. 
I know bringing the servers home is easier said than done. But nobody said running a nation the size 
of India and protecting it from ever increasing and new technologically complex threats was going 
to be easy. Once the servers are all here, a lot or all of the government’s trouble with encrypted data 
would be tackled. Remember that USA, even with Stellar Wind is unable to get all the data it wants 
without having to request technology companies for data cooperation and the technology 
corporations still display their inability to cooperate, in spite of court orders, citing technological 
infeasibilities. 
Secondly, the government would need to set up ‘checks and balances’. These would be policies on 
when the event of targeting specific users would arise as against the normal, steady state 
anonymous scooping of data that would be analysed for anti-national, terror oriented chatter without 
invoking future privacy clauses. This should not be a huge challenge at all, as right now cellular 
phones are snooped on legally in India, where the snooping does get individualistic rather than 
anonymized. A similar legal process that is adapted to the idiosyncrasies of the cyberworld would 
need to be put in place. However, those pockets of the web that are popularly known as the “Deep 
Web” or the “Darknet”, the underworld of the world wide web where illegal wares are transacted, 
should be exempt from the application of such checks and balances. 
Thirdly, and last but not least, developing cyber intelligence systems should become the core focus. 
The entire policy would look good on paper alone if we haven’t an institutionalized cyber 
intelligence effort in place. In fact, this would speak beautifully to the “Skill India” program of the 
Narendra Modi government. One can leverage on the latent strength of highly skilled Indian 
programmers, arguably the best in the world, and integrate them in the effort and create the most 
powerful army of computer programmers. This itself might have positive unintended spin offs that 
could unleash cyber innovation, thus adding to the economy. 
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A word of caution would be that such programmers must be vetted and the 
government must not commission an organization that might have even an iota of conflict of 
interest. For example, if an organization, no matter howsoever “Indian” it might be, has been 
engaged by external security agencies such as, say, FBI, then such organizations ought not to be 
involved in developing an Indian version of the Stellar Wind in anyway whatsoever. Such 
operations simply cannot be outsourced and must be inhoused, built ground up by the agencies of 
the government. 
This should not be very difficult and considering that the Narendra Modi government is progressing 
in the direction of developing cyber capabilities indigenously, as evident in mainstreaming an 
indigenous, highly secure computer operating system named BOSS – Bharat Operating System 
Solutions. BOSS would replace Microsoft Windows, most likely because Windows is considered an 
obvious vulnerability and would be our first and defensive step in cyberwarfare. The next level of 
the discourse would be developing a cyber intelligence system that would be the offensive system, 
where we shall be in hot pursuit of cyberterrorists. And we’d be home! 
One hopes, trusts and prays that these words would ring closer to home and appropriate action 
would be taken to set the discourse onto the correct path. 
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